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RECENT CASE
EVIDENCE-TURNCOAT WITNESS-CONFLICTING TESTIMONY
In the recent case of Wolansky v. Lawson, 389 Pa. 477, 133 A.2d 843
(1957), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a trial court's submission of a case to a jury on the basis of all of plaintiff's evidence which included repudiated testimony of two witnesses who recanted in open court,
was fatal error and that the evidence did not support the verdict. The rule
applied by the court is that where a witness has testified to two different versions or has made inconsistent and contradictory statements, and is confronted
with that contradiction, his final statement is the only substantive evidence.
After citing authority for the rule, the court said, "The rule is of course all
the more applicable where the witness positively repudiates his earlier testimony." 1
One reason previously given for this rule is that the court is not required
to submit evidence which will merely enable the jury to guess at a fact in
favor of a party who was bound to prove it.2 It has repeatedly been decided
that where the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish certain facts
before a recovery can be had, and his testimony or that of his witnesses, on
the question, is so contradictory as to present to the jury no basis for a finding,
except a mere conjecture, a non-suit is properly entered. 3
Previous to Wolansky v. Lawson, however, the rule applied in the instant
case has not been used in Pennsylvania to overrule the disposition of the case
by the trial judge. It is interesting to note that in all the cases cited by the
court as authority, the result of the decision on appeal was to affirm the trial
court's disposition of the case.' This has some significance since another
consideration of the Supreme Court in its prior application of the rule appears to have been to give some effect to the discretion exercised by the trial
judge in deciding the question of whether to submit plaintiff's evidence to the
jury. It is a recognized principle that the trial judge and the jury are best
1 389 Pa. at 480, 133 A.2d at 844.
2

Ely v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 158 Pa. 233, 27 At!. 970 (1893); 66 A.L.R. 1517.
83 (1924); Zenzil v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.,
257 Pa. 473, 101 At. 809 (1917); Black v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 239 Pa. 463, 86 Atl.
1066, (1913); Mulligan v. Lehigh Traction Co., 241 Pa. 139, 88 Atl, 318 (1913).
4Black v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., supra note 3; Stewart v. Ray, 366 Pa. 134, 76 A.2d
628 (1950); Cox v. Wilkes-Barre Railway Corp., 340 Pa. 554, 17 A.2d 367 (1941); Mulligan v.
Lehigh Traction Co., supra note 3.
f 198)]
3 Goater v. Klotz, 279 Pa. 392, 124 At.
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qualified to determine the veracity and credibility of the testimony given, due
to their presence at the trial which enables them to observe the general demeanor of the witness.5
The Wolansky case may be distinguished from the cases it cites in another important aspect. That is, in the Wolansky case there is a complete
contradiction and reversal of previous statements given under oath. Here
the witnesses were first called by plaintiff and were subjected to cross-examination, and later called by the defendant and again cross-examined. Upon
being called by the defendant, the witnesses stated that they had testified
falsely at their first appearance. The cases cited by the court as authority do
not involve any such intentional prevarication but only deal with mere inconsistencies or contradictions which the witness attempted to explain away.
It is suggested therefore that the rule as applied to the earlier Pennsylvania
cases was an attempt by the court to preclude the jury from considering any
inconsistent statements which were subsequently clarified.6
In view of the foregoing considerations it would appear that the Wlolansky case represents an extension of the rule as previously applied in Pennsylvania. With this apparent extension in mind, it seems profitable to explore
the effect of this extension and the possible future ramifications of the rule
as extended.
The effect of the rule in the instant case is that whenever a witness
changes his testimony as to a specific fact, the last testimony is the only substantive evidence and a jury will not be allowed to pass on the veracity and
credibility of the witness in relation to his first story, in cases where plaintiff's
cause of action rests on this first testimony.
It has been held that the weight and the value of the testimony of every
witness is for the jury, even where such testimony is not denied or contradicted.7 Also if the testimony of the parties is contradictory in all essentials,
only a jury can decide the question of veracity and credibility.8 The extension
of the rule in the Wolansky case appears to negate any possible question of
the veracity or credibility of the self-contradicting witness in his first testi5 It is not suggested that the rule should be inapplicable in all cases where its use would result
in a reversal of the trial judge, however, this consideration does appear to have played some part
in the prior application of the rule in Pennsylvania.
6 In Stewart v. Ray, 366 Pa. 134, 138, while affirming the trial judge's submission of the case
to the jury, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said, "A careful review of the testimony, particularly
that of Magrino and Threnhauser, leads to the unalterable conclusion that the testimony of Magrino
is consistent throughout and that the testimony of Threnhauser. while less clear, is equally positive
and consistent as regard the happening of the accident."
7 Rice v. Bauer, 359 Pa. 544, 59 A.2d 885 (1948).
8 Miller v. Harris, 349 Pa. 55, 36 A.2d 309 (1944).
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mony. The question cannot go to the jury even if the trial judge believes that
this would be the best way to resolve the conflict in testimony. As was argued
by Justice Musmanno in the dissenting opinion, it appears that the Supreme
Court is deciding that a witness who admittedly testified falsely one time invariably tells the truth upon changing his testimony. It is submitted that a
better rule would be to allow the trial judge, in his discretion, to dispose of
the conflicting testimony as he deems proper, with the appellate court providing a safeguard for manifest abuse.
The rule in the Wolansky case is at least somewhat analogous to the rule
that prior inconsistent statements cannot be used as substantive evidence but
only can be used for impeachment purposes. The reason for this rule, of
course, is that such inconsistencies are hearsay."0 Courts have repeatedly
pointed out that prior inconsistent statements are not given under oath nor
are they subject to cross-examination. Although this view is generally accepted
by the courts, two of the most influential and learned men in the field of evidence have suggested that this rule be discarded." Professor McCormick has
said, "All in all, in view of these considerations, and after reading hundreds
of illustrative cases, the writer believes that as a class prior inconsistent statements, when they are so verified that their actual making is not in doubt, are
more reliable as evidence of the facts than the later testimony of the same
witnesses." 12 The "considerations" the author refers to are the fact that in
these cases there is an opportunity to cross-examine the witness thoroughly
and also the prior inconsistent statements are perhaps superior in trustworthiness due to their recency and proximity to the fact situation.
This writer suggests that in cases, in which a witness reverses his prior
testimony, the reasoning of Professor McCormick is at least partially applicable. That is, here the witness is subject to cross-examination, and the testimony is under oath and thus cannot violate the traditional concepts of the
hearsay rule.
It is interesting to speculate concerning what possible ill-effects the rule of
the Wolansky case may produce in the future.
One possible result may be to encourage litigants to attempt to influence
witnesses. In a case where a large verdict is expected in favor of the plaintiff,
9 389 Pa. at 484, 133 A.2d at 846.

10 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3rd ed. 1940), and cases cited therein; 133 A.L.R. 1454
(1941); Lavodnick v. A. Rose and Son, 297 Pa. 86, 146 At. 455 (1929).
11 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018(b) (3rd ed. 1940) quoted with approval in Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F.2d 352, 358 (8th Cir. 1939) and McCormick, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 573
(1947).
12 25 TEXAs L. REV. at 578.
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the defendant may be greatly tempted to "persuade" the witnesses to reverse
their version of the facts after they have testified for plaintiff. The extension
of this rule by the Supreme Court would insure defendant of a verdict or a
13
non-suit if this could be accomplished.
The rule of the Wolansky case would also result in serious difficulties
for plaintiffs who were unable to avail themselves of honest and unwavering
witnesses. Suppose, for example, that A was injured by the negligent operation of an automobile by B. The only witness that A could produce is W who
saw the accident. W is a weak-willed and easily persuaded individual. B's
attorney on cross-examination cannot induce W to change his version of the
accident which favors A, but later calls W as B's witness. W now testifies
that B was not at fault. A's chances for any recovery have vanished, and his
cause of action is defeated regardless of the judge and jury's belief of the
witness' first testimony. There is an obvious injustice here. It seems logical
that A should be allowed to have the contradictory testimony of W resolved
by the jury if his case is dependent on it.
It is suggested that the. instant ruling of the Supreme Court may produce
an unnecessary uncertainty in the law of evidence in Pennsylvania and that
perhaps the rule cited by the court 'should not be extended to fact situations
similar to the Wolansky case. It will be interesting to note to what extent
the case of Wolansky v. Lawson is adopted by the courts of Pennsylvania in
the future.
JOHN M. KUCHKA.
13 In the Wolansky case, there was some evidence of an attempt to influence the change in
testimony. To some extent, this fact could justify the trial judge's decision to submit the case to
the jury.

